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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
S. W. MORRISON, JR., Co-Administrator of the
Estate of Fannie P. Morrison, deeeased,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Vs.
WALKER BANK & TRUST CO~IP ANY, a corporation, Administrator with the Will Annexed
of the Estate of Chauncey P. Overfield, also
known as C. P. Overfield, deceased,
Defendant and Respondent.

STATEME:NT OF FACTS
Fannie P. Morrison died on the 28th day of November, 1941. On the 6th day of Decernber, 1941, a petition
for Letters of Administration upon her estate was filed
in the District Court of Salt Lake County, by S. W.
Morrison, Jr., a son of the decedent, and lone l\1. Overfield, a daughter of the decedent, requesting their appointment as administrators. On the 20th day of April,
1942, Letters of Administration upon her estate were
issued to S. W. 1\Iorrison, Jr., and lone l\f. Overfield,
and since said tirne they have continued to act as such
administrators.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In the petition it is alleged that the estate of the
decedent consists of notes, accounts receivable, and
choses in action, of the value of $4,000.00. No inventory of the 'estate has ever been filed, (See Probate File
Fannie P. Morrison), although under Section 75-7-1,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the administrator must file
and make a return to the Court, within three months
after his appointment, a true inventory and appraisement of the ·estate of the decedent which has come to
his knowledge and possession.
Chauncey P. Overfield died on the 14th day of
July, 1958. He died leaving a will, which was admitted
to probate in the District Court of Salt Lake County.
lone M. Overfield, his wife, was named as executrix
thereof. She, however, waived her right to act as such
executrix and petitioned for the appointment of Walker
Banll & Trust Company as Administrator with the Will
annexed. Walker Bank & Trust Company was appointed and qualified as such administrator with the Will
annexed on the 7th day of August, 1958. Since then
the Bank has acted as such administrator.
Notice to Creditors in relation to the Overfield
Estate was published as required by law, and on the
29th day of January, 1959, the last day for presentation
of claims, there was presented to the Administrator of
the Overfield Estate, a Creditor's Claim by S. W. Morrison, Jr., as co-administrator of the Estate of Fannie
P. Morrison, deceased. The claim is for $44,415.34, and
is purportedly for 16,395 shares of stock of Independent
Coal and Coke Company, at $1.00 per share par value,
or $16,395.00, and for dividends purportedly retained
2
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over and above complete discharge of obligation for
which the above stock was claimed to have been pledged
as collateral, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum
to January 20, 1959, in the amount of $28,020.34. The
claim was disallowed and rejected by the Walker Bank
& Trust Company as administrator of the estate of
Chauncey P. Overfield on the 29th day of January,
1959, and notice of rejection of the clairn was given to
S. W. Morrison, Jr., co-administrator of the Estate
of Fannie P. Morrison, deceased, by the Walker Bank
& Trust Company as Administrator with the Will Annexed, and notice of rej·ection of sucl1 claim was filed
with the Clerk of the District Court of Salt Lake
County, on the 30th day of January, 1959.
On the 29th day of April, 1959, S. W. Morrison,
Jr., as co-administrator of the Estate of Fannie P.
Morrison, deceased, filed a complaint in the District
Court of Salt Lake County, against the R·espondent
herein, for an accounting of stock alleged to have been
converted by the decedent, Chauncey P. Overfield, and
for judgment against the W allter Bank & Trust Company, as such administrator in the amount of $44,415.34,
plus interest and costs, and later by an an1ended compaint it was alleged by S. W. Morrison, Jr., co-administrator of the Estate of Fannie P. :1£orrison, deceased,
that Fannie P. Morrison had borrowed son1e $3,500.00
from Chauncey P. Overfield, and to secure the payment
thereof had delivered to the said Chauncey P. Overfield, as Trust;ee under an express trust or a trust implied by law, approximately 16,136 shares of capital
stock of Independent Coal and Coke Company, with a
further allegation that the stock was to be held by him
3
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as such trustee until said loan shall have been repaid
through the application of dividends declared upon the
stock.
The amended complaint further alleges that during
the lifetime of Chauneey P. Overfield, he received dividends from said stock sufficient to re-pay the loan and
interest on said purp~ed loan, and the amended complaint alleges that he refused to return the stock to
the plaintiff or to acount for the value of it; that the
stock was transferred between May and November, 1941
to lone M. Overfield and to the two daughters of Overfield. It is claimed that Fannie P. Morrison and S. W.
Morrison, Jr., as such administrator, had no knowledge
of such transfers.
The Walker Bank & Trust Company, as administrator with the Will annexed of the decedent, Chauncey P.
Overfield, denies that a loan was ever made by Overfield
to Fannie P. Morrison, as allleged herein, denies that
Overfield ever received stock in his lifetime, or that there
was a trust ever created as alleged, and denies that he
transferred, or caused to be transferred, the stock allegedly belonging to Fannie P. Morrison, to lone M.
Overfield, his wife, and to his daughters, and sets up
further defenses which will be set forth in the argument.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL, COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO PERMIT TE.STIMONY TO BE GIVEN BY S. W.
MORRISON AND lONE M. OVERFIELD UNDER
SECTION 78-24-2, UTAH CODE: ANNOTATED, 1953.
4
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At the trial of this case it was stipulated and admitted by both the plaintiff and the defendant that lone
M. Overfield is the wife of C. P. Overfield, and that lone
M. Overfield is the daughter of Fannie P. Morrison, and
that S. W. Morrison, Jr. is the son of Fannie P.
Morrison, and both are h·eirs and beneficiaries in the
estate of Fannie P. Morrison, deceased, (Tr. 16), and
as a matter of fact, and it is not disputed, that they are
the sole heirs and beneficiaries of the ·estate of Fannie
P. Morrison. Both S. W. Morrison, Jr. and lone M.
Overfield derive their interest in said estate from their
mother, Fannie P. Morrison, and subject to the rights
of creditors, the costs and expenses of administration,
they will be the recipients of all the property belonging
to the estate of their mother, Fannie P. l\Iorrison.
In the case of Maxfield vs. Sainsbury, 110 Utah
280, 172 Pac. 2nd 122, which is cited by the appellant
and construing Section 78-24-2, Utah Code Annotat~ed,
1953, it is stated as follows:
"The purpose of the statute is to guard
against the temptation to give false testimony
in regard to a transaction with a deceased person
by the surviving party when the transaction is
involved in a law suit and death has sealed the
mouth of the other party."
In this case the co-adn1inistrator of the estate of
Fannie P. Morrison, deceased, is se·eking judgment
against the adn1inistrator of the Overfield estate and
if successful there 'vould be subtracted fro1n the Overestate assets no\v elaimed by the Overfield Estate, and
which are part of the Overfield estate.
5
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Continuing further in the opinion the Court states:
"For the purpose of clarification, we shall
eliminate the parts of the statute which do not
have a bearing on our question. It then reads:
The following persons cannot be witnesses:

* * * * *
(3) A party to any civil action * * * and
any persons directly interestf~n the event thereof * * * when the adverse party in such action
* * * claims or opposes, sues or defends * * *
as the executor * * * of any deceased person,
* * * as to any statement by * * * such deceas'ed * * * person * * * which must have
been equally within the knowledge of both the
witness and such * * * deceased person unless
* * * called to testify th'ereto by (the executor)."
Morrison is attempting to prove the transaction
purportedly entered into with Overfield through his
testimony and the testimony of lone M. Overfi'eld, wife
of the decedent. At least this is the offer he is making.
Morrison, as co-administrator, has a direct interest in
this action and th'e alleged transaction involving the
Overfield Estate. He is the plaintiff in this action.
He is basing his claim for suit entirely upon an alleged
transaction between himself and Overfield. He is offering testimony of a co-administrator. Whether he
will be able to produce such testimony is problematical,
but assuming it was produced, the other co-administrator
has a direct interest in the action. The matters pertaining to the alleged transaction are equally within
the knowledge of the offered witnesss and the deceased.
6
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S. W. Morrison, Jr. and lone ~I. Overfield, as individuals, are both interested directly in the transaction
involved in this action and the outcome tlrereof. They
will be the owners of all the property in the estate
of Fannie P. Morrison after creditors are satisfi'ed,
funeral expenses paid and probate proceedings completed. Morrison and his sister do not have a small
interest in the estate, they are to be the recipients of
the whole estate. The degree of the inter:est which such
witness has in the transaction and in the final adjudication of an action should be taken into consideration
in determining whether such witness is eligible to testify
against a deceased person. To permit testimony of
such person and under such conditions opens the door
for the giving of false testimony in regard to a transaction with a deceas'ed person and nullifies the very
purpose for which the so-called Dead Man's Statute
was enacted.
The offered witnesses were prop'erly excluded from
testifying as to the purported agreement alleged to
have been entered into between C. P. Overfield and
Fannie P. Morrison in her lifetime.
Plaintiff claims the loan of $3,500.00 to Fannie P.
Morrison was consumated by C. P. Overfield; that lone
M. Overfield acted as agent. This the defendant denies,
but assuming that the loan was made as alleged, defendant contends that the offer of testimony made by
the plaintiff contradicts the alleged agency. It" it stated
(Tr. 18) in the offer that on the 5th day of May, 1941,
Fannie P. Morrison, r'epresented by Seth W. Morrison,
applied to lone M. Overfield for a loan of approximately
7
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$3,500.00. lone M. Overfield, it is claimed, stated she
would be unable to make such loan from her own personal funds, but would call her husband to see if he
would. She was advised that she might make a loan
(Tr. 19). lone M. Overfield made the loan. Sh'e delivered a check, or checks, to S. W. Morrison, Jr., aggregating $3,500.00. The stock was delivered to lone
M. Overfield (Tr. 19). lone M. Overfield signed a paper,
or receipt, acknowledging deposit of the shares of stock
as collateral for the loan (Tr. 19). Later after the
death of Mrs. Morrison, it is claimed, Overfield asked
what the assets of the estate consisted. S. W. Morrison,
Jr. listed various mining stocks and mentioned the
stock pledged with Mrs. Overfield (Tr. 20).
Later in 1942, and in years subsequent thereto, it
is claimed, S. W. Morrison, Jr., inquired of his· sister,
lone J\II. Overfield, concerning the situation regarding
the stock of the Independent Coal and Coke Company,
and it is further claimed that Mrs. Overfield promised,
or assured him that any matters in connection with
the sam'e would be taken care of or straightened out
relative to the same. (Tr. 20).
The offer further states that lone M. Overfield and
C. P. Overfield either maintained a joint Bank account
at the Irving Trust Company, or that funds in an account of Mrs. Overfield in fact were those of her husband, subject to withdrawal by her with his consent.
(Tr. 20). The whole alleged transaction, according to
the offer, was with lone M. Overfield individually and
not with C. P. Overfield. Whether the purported mon'ey
loaned came from an individual account of lone M. Overfield or whether it came from a joint account with her

'
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husband, or whether it came from an account of Mrs.
Overfield, which was in fact lrer husband's, subject to
withdrawal by her upon his express consent, is of little
consequence to prove an agency. She made the purported loan according to the offer. She delivered the
checks. The stock was delivered to lone M. Overfield.
(Tr. 20). There is no evidence or offer of evidence
that C. P. Overfield ever came into possession of the
stock. The stock claimed was transferred directly from
the nam'e of Fannie P. Morrison, prior to her death, to
lone M. Overfield and to her two daugthers. Plaintiff
admits that the stock was never in the name of C. P.
Overfield. ( Tr. 23). lone M. Overfield and her
daughters received the dividends alleged to have been
paid from the year 1941, and apparently are still receiving the dividends therefrom. (Tr. 20).
Morrison, the co-administrator, claimnd he had no
knowledge that the stock had be'en transferred to lone
M. Overfield and her two daughters. As a~nistrator
of the estate of Fannie P. Morrison, he would, or should
have known that the stock had be'en transferred to someone otherwise he, as administrator, would have been receiving the dividends during this time.
The burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to establish facts suffici'ent to sustain the complaint by preponderance of the evidence. These facts cannot be
sustained upon mere speculation or inference. There
is no evidence presented or offered to establish the claim
upon which this action is founded.
The plaintiff cites certain authorities 1n which it
is held that the husband or 'vife, acting as agent for the
9
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other spouse, was competent to testify as to transactions had with a deceased p erson.
1

In the case of Porter vs. Dunn, 30 N. E. 122, the
husband sued on a common law right to avail himself of
the profit or benefit from the wife's services as a nurse
for a deceas'ed person, and in permitting the wife to
testify the Court held that this was a right which was
independent of any claim which the wife individually
had and pern1itted the testimony.
In the case of Whitman vs. Foley, 26 N. E. 725, the
husband had no interest in the claim, and the court permitted him to testify.
In the case of Severcool vs. Wilsey, 39 N. Y. Supp.
413, it was held that the spouse, as agent, had no interest
in the matter direct or financial.
None of thes e cases are in point with the instant
case. Both S. W. Morrison, Jr. and lone M. Overfield
stand to gain a direct financial interest if the claim of
the co-administrator in the Morrison estate is established, and, therefor'e, neither of these persons should
be permitted to testify in this matter.
1

We believe that the offer of testimony made by the
co-administrator of lone M. Overfi'eld is overstated;
that the co-administrator will be not be able to produce
her testimony as offered. Further it is the contention
of the defendant that lone M. Overfield, wife of C. P.
Overfield, would not be a competent witness under the
provisions of the Statutes of the State of Utah, Section
28-24-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Plaintiff in his brief cites provisions of the Con10
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stitution of the State of Utah, Sections I and II of
Article I, and states that his rights have been violated
because of his witn esses being barred from testifying.
In answer to this, defendant contends that no constitutional rights of the plaintiff have been violated at his
trial in the District Court because of the ruling that
S. W. Morrison, Jr. and lone M. Overfi'eld were not
competent to testify. He was permitted to offer testimony in proof of his action. He was not barred from
prosecuting his claim.
The mere fact that certain
testimony offered was excluded under the law did not
take away any of his constitutional rights.
1

POINT 2.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY EITHE~R THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 78-12-25 OR SECTION 78-1223 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.
The amended complaint of the plaintiff (paragraph
3) alleges as follows:
"3. During approxin1ately ~lay, 1941, said
Fannie P. Morrison borrowed $3,500.00 from said

Chauncey P. Overfield and to secure payment
thereof delivered to said Chauncey P. Overfield
as trustee under an express trust or a trust implied by law, approximately 16,136 shares of
capital stock of Independent Coal and Coke Company, a corporation, to be held by him as such
trustee until said loan shall have been repaid
with the right to apply the dividends upon said
stock in repayn1ent of said loan and under the
11
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obligation to return said shares of stock to said
Fannie P. Morrison upon repayment of said
loan."
The evidence introduced by the plaintiff clearly
shows S. W. Morrison, Jr. was a stockholder of the
Independent Coal and Coke Company from the month
of 1\Iarch, 1941, through June, 1947. (Tr. 13). He was
paid the same dividends per share as other stockholde-rs
on 1000 shares of stock owned by him during this period
of time (Tr. 12). Under the allegations of the complaint the right to apply the dividends upon the stock
in repayment of the alleged loan was granted with the
obligation to return the stock to Fannie P. Morrison
upon repayment of the loan.
S. W. Morrison, Jr., the co-administrator, is a man
of business experien.ce and well knew that the dividends
on this stock would be payable to the person, or persons,
in whose name, or names, the stock was registered on
the books of the Company, and it must have been transferred to someone from the name of Fannie P. Morrison,
otherwise he, as administrator of the estate of Fannie
P. ~Iorrison, would have received such dividends.
As a stockholder of the Independent Coal and Coke
Company, he knew, according to the testimony introduced by the plaintiff, that applying the dividends declared and paid on the stock to the purport~ed loan of
$3,500.00, with interest theron at 6% per annum, the
loan would have been paid off in December, 1943, (Tr.
21) and the obligation to return the stock accruled in
December, 1943. Yet, knowing this, he took no legal
action to obtain the stock. The Statute of Limitations
12
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started to run in December, 19·43, and the action became
barred by either the provisions of Section 78-12-25 within four years thereafter, or under Section 78-12-23
within six years thereafter, so that even under the
longest period of time, the claim, or action thereon, became due and was barred during the month of December, 1949.
More than nine years beyond that time
elapsed and after the death of C. P. Overfield, before
S. W. Morrison, Jr., as co-administrator, asserted any
claim to the stock. C. P. Overfield is not here to defend
this action. His mouth is closed forever. The defendant
will discuss the equitable side of this case in the succeeding point.
POINT 3.
L.ACHES
THE PLAINTIFF IS GUILTY OF LACHE'S IN
FAILING TO ASSERT AN ALLEGED RIGHT.
While contending that the Statute of Limitations
clearly applies, the defendant has also pleaded laches.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff has slept on his
rights. Years have passed without asserting alleged
rights, and more than seventeen years since the alleged
transaction. No action was taken by the plaintiff to
assert the alleged rights during the lifetime of C. P.
Overfield. He waited until after the death of Overfield
to bring the action. Overfield was never given the opportunity of refuting the claim during his lifetime. He
is gone. His estate cannot have the benefit of the evidence from hin1. It is prejudiced because of the dilatory acts of the plaintiff, and because of such delay
the evidence which n1ight be available in defense of this
13
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action cannot be obtained. It was held in th·e case
of Ham1nond vs. Hopkins, 143 U.S. 224, 36 L Ed 134:
"Where the seal of death has closed the lips
of those whose character is involved and lapse
of time has impaired the recollection of transactions and obscured their details, the welfare of
society demands the rigid enforcement of the
rule of diligence."
In the case of Dennison vs. McCann, et al (Ky)
197 So. Western 2nd 248, a daughter's action to set
aside a de·ed executed by her mother to another daughter
on ground of undue influence was barred by laches,
where daughter with knowledge of the deed admit~
tedly waited bringing the action until after mother's
death, a period of eighteen months. The Court said:
"Neither can it be disputed that her delay
has closed the mouth of the principal participant
in the transaction she is questioning. The time
for her to have attacked the deed was prior to
th'e mother's death."
In re. Grotes Estate (Pa) 135 Atl. 2nd 383. The
Court states:
"Laches arises when a defendant's position
or rights are so prejudicied by length of time
and inexcusable delay, plus attendant facts and
circumstances, that it would be injustice to permit presently the assertion of a claim against
him.''
14
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POINT 4.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY THE; PR,OVISIONS
OF SECTION 25-5-4, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
1953.
Section 25-5-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides:
"CERTAIN AGREE1IENTS VOID UNLESS WRITTEN AND SUBSCRIBED. -In
the following cases every agreement shall be
void unless such agre·emnt, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the
party to be charged therewith:
(1)£very agreement that by its terms is not
to be performed within one year from the making thereof."
The claim which was filed by S. W. Morrison, Jr.
as co-administrator of the Estate of Fannie P. Morrison
is as follows :
"16,395 shares of stock of Independent Coal & Coke Co. Wyo. at $1.00
per share, par value --------------------------------$16,395.00
Dividends retained over and above
complete discharge of obligation for
which the above stock was pledged ____ 28,020.34
as collateral, "\Yith straight interest at
6 (/o per annu1n to January 20, 1959.
TOTAL
$44,415.34
This action is based upon a purported elain1 'vhich
15
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was filed in the estate of
clain1 is not founded upon
scope of the claim cannot
thing beyond that which is

Chauncey P. Overfield. Th'e
any written instrument. The
be widened to include somestated th'erein.

Paragraph 3 of the Amended Complaint of the
plaintiff in this action provides as follows:
"3. During approximately May, 1941, said
Fannie P. Morrison borrowed $3,500.00 from said
Chauncey P. Overfield and to secure payment
thereof delivered to said Chauncey P. Overfield
as trustee under an express trust or a trust implied by law, approximately 16,136 shares of
capital stock of Independent Coal and Coke
Company, a corporation, to be held by him as
such trustee until said loan shall have been repaid with the right to apply the dividends upon
said stock in repayment of said loan and under
the obligation to return said shares of capital
stock to said Fannie P. Morrison upon repayment of said loan."
It will be noted that under the allegations of said
paragraph the alleged shares of capital stock of the
Independent Coal and Coke Company were to be held by
th alleged trustee until said loan shall have been repaid with the right to apply the dividends upon said
stock in payment of said loan. It is 'evident from the
evidence introduced in this case that this alleged agreement was not to be performed within a period of one
year. The claim does not show that it was in writing.
N'either is there any evidence introduced of any writing concerning this agreement. If there was any writ16
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ten instruments concerning this alleged agreement, it
was necessary that it be incorpo·rated within the claim
fil ed with the administrator of the estate of Chauncey
P. Overfield.
1

Section 75-9-5 Utah Code Annotated, 19·53, provides as follows :
"CONTENTS OF CLAil\I - VERIFICATION. - Ervery claim which is due, when presented to the executor or administrator, must be
supported by tlre affidavit of the claimant or
someone in his behalf that the amount is justly
due, that no payments have been made thereon
which are not credited, and that there are no offsets to th'e same, to the knowledge of the affiant.
If the claim is not due when presented, or is
contingent, the particulars of such claim must
be stated. When the affidavit is made by a person other than the claimant he 1nust set forth
in the affidavit th~e reason why it is not made
by the claimant. The executor or administrator
may also require satisfactory vouchers or proofs
to be produced in support of the claim. If the
claim is founded on a bond, bill, note or any other
instrument, a copy of such instrument must accompany the claim, and the original instrument
must be exhibited, if demanded, unless it is lost
or destroyed; in which case the claimant must
accompany his claim by his affidavit, containa copy or particular description of such instruInent, and stating its loss or destruction. - - - - "
In the offer of testilnony by S. W. l\lorrison, Jr.,
17
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co-administrator of the estate of Fannie P. Morrison,
at the trial of the action, and after the pleadings wete
rnade by each party and the issues joined, an attempt
is 1nade to show that the loan was payable on or before
one year after th~e making of the same. This is contrary to Paragraph 3 of the amended complaint. The
plaintiff is bound by the claim and by the allegations
Therefore, the agreement is void
of the complaint.
under the Statut'e of Frauds.

POINT 5.
NO PROPER CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE OF
DECEDENT UPON WHICH THIS ACTION IS
FOUNDED HAS BEEN PRESENTED AS REQUIRED BY STATUTE.
Section 75-9-11, Utah Code Annotat'Hd, 1953, insofar as it is applicable to this case provides:
"PRESENTATION A PREREQUISITE
TO SUIT-ENFORCEMENT OF LIENS EXCEPTED.-N o holder of any claim against an
estate shall maintain any action thereon unless
the claim is first presented to the executor or
.. t ra t or, - - - - -"
a dmrn1s

In the offer made by the plaintiff at the trial
of this action it is asserted that some written instrument was executed pertaining to this alleged transaction.
Section 75-9-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the
contents of which are set forth in Point 4 of this Brief,
requires that if the claim is founded upon a bond, bill,
18
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note or other instrument, a copy of such instrument
must accompany the claim and the original must be exhibited if demanded unless it is lost or destroyed, and
if lost or destroyed, claimant must accompany his
claim by an affidavit containing a copy or particular
description of such instrument stating its loss or destruction. The plaintiff has failed to conform to the
statutory provisions in presenting his claim.
This court in the case of General Talking Pictures
Corporation vs. Hyatt, 144 Utah 362, 199 Pac. 2nd 147,
held that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the
statutory procedure for filing a claim against tlre decedent's estate in that it failed to accompany its claim with
a copy of the instrument upon which the claim was
founded, and that because of such failure, the claim
was not sufficient under the statute to maintain an
action against the ex~ecutrix of the estate thereon.
POINT 6.
THE ACT OF S. W. MORRISON, JR., AS CO- ADMINISTRATOR IN FILING THE PURPORTED
CLAIM AND COMMENCING SUIT THERON IS INVALID.
Section 75-11-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as follows :
''WHEN THERE~ ARE SEVERAL NAMED'
OR APPOINTED. - When all the executors
named are not appointed by the court, those appointed have the san1e authority to plerform all
acts and discharge the trust required by the will
as effectually for every purpose as if all "~ere
19
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appointed and were acting togetl'!er; where there
are two executors or administrators, the act of
one alone shall be effectual, if the other is absent
from the state or laboring under any legal disability from S erving, or if he has given his coadministrator authority in writing to act for
both; and where there are more than two executors or administrators the act of a majority· is
valid."
1

In this case, tlreTe is no evidence before the Court
that lone M. Overfield was absent from the State of
Utah at the time of the filing of the claim, or the filing
of the action, or that she was laboring under any legal
disability from serving as such co-administrator, nor
is there any ·evidence before the Court that she has given
Morrison, as co-administrator, any authority in writing
to act for the both of them in making such claim and
filing such suit.
In the case of Utah Loan and Trust Company, appellant vs. Robert Barbutt, respondent, 6 Utah, Page
342, it was held that the act of one executor in executing
a leas·e was without authority, and the lease was invalid
because his co-executor had not signed said lease, it
being shown that the executors were within the Territory
of Utah and free from any legal disability, and the \executor signing said lease had no written authority from
the other to sign such lease.
CONCLUSION
Defendant states that in view of the evidence which
20
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was introduced in this case by the plaintiff and under
the defenses pleaded and raised by the d·efendant, there
are ample grounds to sustain the judgment of the Court
in granting a non-suit upon the grounds that there was
no evidence to substantiate the allegations and claims
of the complaint. The judgment of the District Court
should, therefore, be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
SA~IUEL

C. POWELL
Attorney for Respondent
614 Eccl es Building
Ogden, Utah
1
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